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Borrowing from the Old [Common Law] To
Litigate the New [Beacon Surveillance Claims]
Courtney Albini†
I. INTRODUCTION
Although new technologies are propelling modern society into an
era of extraordinary connectivity, such advances simultaneously leave
unaware citizens vulnerable to unprecedented personal invasions of
privacy. Moreover, the speed at which technology advances within the
areas of e-commerce, smartphones, social media, the cloud, and the in-
ternet of things, outpaces lawmakers’ abilities to craft new regulations
and electronic privacy laws. Consequently, beholden legal concepts,
such as an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, a defend-
ant’s engagement in highly offensive conduct, the voluntary disclosure
of information to third parties, and unlawful intrusions into one’s soli-
tude, must be reevaluated as modern plaintiffs grow increasingly mo-
tivated to have their privacy concerns recognized by lawmakers. Un-
fortunately for plaintiffs, the legal infrastructure in America, unlike
other nations, lacks a comprehensive data privacy statute that encom-
passes all sets of privacy concerns.1 Instead, the American data priva-
cy law landscape is “a mosaic of sector-specific laws,”2 each of which
“provides protection for certain specific types of information” and “un-
† A.B. 2013, University of Pennsylvania; M.Phil 2014, University of Cambridge; J.D. Can-
didate 2019, The University of Chicago Law School. I owe gratitude for the insight of Professors
Laura Weinrib and Lior Strahilevitz, whose suggestions and edits helped me translate mere ide-
as into written form. Equally, I am thankful for the thoughtful recommendations of current and
past The University of Chicago Legal Forum staff and board members that helped refined vari-
ous versions of the Comment. And finally, I thank my parents, Rachelle and Ed Albini, for al-
ways encouraging me to follow my passions.
1 James B. Rule, When it comes to protecting its citizens’ data, Europe is way ahead of the
U.S., L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-rule-nsa-privacy-
european-union-20140513-story.html [https://perma.cc/M7XF-BJ4H].
2 Some prominent examples of “sector specific” privacy laws include: the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, the Stored Communications Act (Title II of the ECPA), the Federal Wiretap Act
(Title I of the ECPA), the CAN-SPAM Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, and the Video Privacy Protection Act.
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derpins private rights of action for improper access to, or use of, that
information” in a limited technical area.3 When faced with this quan-
dary, a critical inquiry to raise is: should lawmakers work more rapid-
ly to craft legislation that addresses privacy concerns related to every
new and niche technical platform? Or, because the rapid pace of tech-
nology growth would require constant amendments to the law, would
it be more fruitful for technology users to bring their novel electronic
privacy claims under battle-tested common law theories of privacy,
specifically, the theory of “an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclu-
sion of another”?4
I argue the latter situation, with the aim of showing why state
common law privacy theories are better suited to protect plaintiffs’
privacy rights related to unprecedented intrusions to privacy perpe-
trated by emerging technologies such as audio beacon ultrasonic cross-
device tracking (“beacon technology”). Equally, I analyze common
threads uniting beacon technology fact patterns in order to advance
ideas of how plaintiffs’ privacy rights can be more predictably protect-
ed under the law. Disadvantages of advancing privacy claims under
seemingly obvious statutes like the Wiretap Act5 will be noted in the
presentation of early beacon-related litigation. I then highlight the
advantages of advancing these same claims under an intrusion upon
seclusion common law theory based on the success of related electronic
privacy litigation. Although such cases will not specifically involve
beacon technology, this Comment will argue that the electronic priva-
cy and surveillance issues are factually similar enough, as to warrant
an extension of the judicial framework.
Furthermore, I will pay heightened attention to California’s elec-
tronic privacy legal environment, given the likelihood that the majori-
ty of future beacon technology suits will be brought in the District
Court for the Northern District of California, per rules of jurisdiction.6
Within the context of California, I will focus on judicial opinions relat-
ed to GPS mobile phone tracking, data content mining, and video sur-
veillance. In addition, I will discuss how the strong privacy protections
enshrined in California’s state Constitution, in addition to California’s
statutory code, lend a powerful backdrop to judges’ future analysis of
3 ROBERT D. BROWNSTONE & TYLER G. NEWBY, DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW § 9:2
(2017).
4 Id. § 9:123.
5 18 U.S. Code § 2511 (2012).
6 The Northern District of California has featured a sizable number of cases relating to
technology privacy questions. This rate is likely a function of the physical locations of many app
developers in Silicon Valley, California, which is included in the Northern District of California.
Consequently, a plaintiff bringing suit can most easily obtain personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendants in this district.
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common law electronic privacy claims. Lastly, I will provide some
analysis of influential Supreme Court decisions, including Riley v.
California7 and United States v. Jones,8 and how such decisions could
have a significant impact on judges’ future decision-making regarding
the privacy of mobile phone content and the limits of surveillance.
II. ANOTHER TRACKING FEATURE INVADING AMERICANS’MOBILE
PHONES
A. Understanding Beacon Technology
If any mobile device user has ever experienced the unsettling oc-
currence of speaking to a friend about an obscure subject, and then
subsequently being greeted by an advertisement targeting that niche
topic the next time she turns on her phone, then the user has been ex-
posed to an early application of beacon technology.9 About four years
ago, companies like Samsung and LG admitted to the practice of cap-
turing portions of phone users’ private communications and then send-
ing them to third-party speech and imaging recognition companies for
the ultimate purpose of creating user-specific advertising.10 Ever since
these admissions, the capabilities of the underlying technology have
evolved rapidly into the more comprehensive and sophisticated beacon
technology, which has improved companies’ abilities to track consumer
preferences. Now, when mobile applications are downloaded onto us-
ers’ smart devices, underlying beacon tracking microphones are acti-
vated and programmed to listen to inaudible messages broadcast via
“audio beacons including.”11 These audio beacons can be activated in-
dependently on a daily basis, including while the user is watching
movies, television and commercials; listening to music; shopping in
stores; or attending sports games and concerts. Once the beacon sig-
nals have been “collected,” third-party companies like the 2015 start-
ups SilverPush, Shopkick and Signal360, can build detailed logs of the
physical activities, retail purchases, and entertainment preferences of
the user.12
7 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
8 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
9 How Audio Beacons Monitor You via Smartphone, NANALYZE (May 29, 2017), https://
www.nanalyze.com/2017/05/audio-beacons-monitor-smartphone/ [https://perma.cc/BE58-W7VZ].
10 Id. For example, Samsung admitted to capturing and sending private conversations to
Nuance Communications, an American multinational computer software technology corporation
headquartered in Burlington, Massachusetts.
11 Id.
12 Lily Hay Newman, How to Block the Ultrasonic Signals You Didn’t Know Were Tracking
You, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/block-ultrasonic-signals-didnt-know-
tracking/ [https://perma.cc/A679-N3TE].
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Despite its sophistication, beacon technology functions in a
straightforward manner: (1) a user downloads a smartphone applica-
tion from a mobile application store (e.g. Apple’s App Store or Google
Play); (2) upon download, the application requests permission to ac-
cess the user’s smartphone microphone; and, (3) if the user agrees,
then the microphone can and will often remain activated whenever
the phone is turned on. Importantly, while activated, the microphone
has the capacity to listen for inaudible beacon frequencies that are
emitted from retail stores, advertisements, and websites. Further-
more, because beacon technology combines “the best of two worlds”—
namely audio tracking capabilities and GPS locating function—an in-
creasing number of smartphone mobile application developers have
incorporated it into their products. In turn, retail corporations, sports
teams, and marketing firms pay for the developers to create an appli-
cation promoting their organization, and work with the developers in
the full-time operation of the application.13
Not surprisingly app developers14 and their diverse range of cli-
ents15 laud the “win-win” benefits of this technology for themselves
and their users: while the app provides consumers a multi-
dimensional, interactive experience based on consumers’ specific per-
sonalities, the organizations are concomitantly able to track consum-
ers’ preferences. In so doing, the corporation can then “nudge” users
into making a financial investment into a team, product, or service
through the expertly targeted funneling of coupons, promotions, and
advertisements directly to users’ phones.16 However, as more applica-
13 Id.
14 The largest app developers that utilize Beacon technology include: iMOBDEV Technolo-
gies, Clearbridge Mobile, Multidots Solutions, K2B Solutions, and Guarana Technologies. See
Top Beacon App Development Companies, RECOVENDOR https://recovendor.com/beacon-app-devel
opment-companies/ [https://perma.cc/G4D3-AW57]; See also Neha Mallik, 5 Best iBeacon Apps
That Are Leading the Pack, BEACONSTAC (Feb. 19, 2015), https://blog.beaconstac.com/2015/02/5-
best-ibeacon-apps-that-are-leading-the-pack/ [https://perma.cc/52D7-8WPL].
15 The range of corporations that contract with Beacon technology app developers include:
the Golden State Warriors basketball team, the Indianapolis Colts football team, Rite Aid, Tar-
get, Macy’s, American Eagle Outfitters, Oscar Mayer, McDonald’s, Lord & Taylor, Walgreens,
Neiman Marcus, Walmart, Tesco, Nordstrom, and MLB.com.; Shubhi Mittal, 25 Retailers Nail-
ing It with Their Proximity Marketing Campaigns, BEACONSTAC (Feb. 11, 2016), https://blog.bea
constac.com/2016/02/25-retailers-nailing-it-with-their-proximity-marketing-campaigns/ [https://
perma.cc/VP88-RUQZ]; Qualcomm to Provide iBeacon Hardware to Work with the ‘MLB.com At
the Ballpark” App, QUALCOMM (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2014
/03/06/qualcomm-provide-ibeacon-hardware-work-mlbcom-ballpark-app
[https://perma.cc/VES8-7PVA]; See Michael J. Stortz et al., Plaintiffs Face Challenges in Cellular
Phone Application Privacy Litigation, DRINKERBIDDLE PUBL’NS, (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/publications/2017/02/plaintiffs-face-challenges-in-
cellular-phone (last visited Apr. 30, 2018).
16 Lily Hay Newman, Hundreds of Apps Can Listen to Marketing ‘Beacons’ You Can’t Hear,
WIRED (May 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/hundreds-apps-can-listen-beacons-cant-
hear/ [https://perma.cc/B9N7-944E].
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tions are deploying beacon with or without a specific retail or promo-
tional purpose, users are less cognizant of its presence within applica-
tions. Thus, they are not aware that when they are granting access to
the microphone upon download it will remain activated during signifi-
cant periods when the users’ phones are on, even if the phones are dis-
connected from the internet.17 Ultimately, these enormous periods of
activation contribute to the building of a biographical snapshot of the
user, of which she has not explicitly consented.18
B. The Current Legal Landscape of Beacon Technology
1. Legal problems presented by “hybrid” tracking features
Inevitably, the newness of beacon technology, coupled with the
unprecedented security issues posed by the all-access audio and physi-
cal location tracking features, have led to rancorous clashes in district
courts. Angered by the “surreptitious” surveillance perpetrated by
their phones, plaintiffs have generally advanced their grievances un-
der various titles of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA),19 particularly Sections 2511(1)(a) and 2511(1)(d) of Title I,
otherwise known as the Wiretap Act.20
Under the Wiretap Act, in particular, plaintiffs have experienced
mixed success. This is especially true in the District Court for the
Northern District of California, the jurisdiction where many of the app
developers are based.21 An analysis of these related judicial opinions
shows that the Wiretap Act is an unpredictable legal vehicle for these
types of claims for two reasons: (1) because under § 2511(1)(a), a pri-
ma facie “interception” claim requires plaintiffs to show the “acquisi-
tion” of a deliberately spoken “oral communication;” and, (2) because
under § 2511 (1)(d), an unlawful “use” claim requires plaintiffs to al-
lege facts to show defendants’ targeted advertisements were based dis-
tinctly on the content of the allegedly “intercepted” communications
made by users’ during the microphones’ activation.22
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
20 Stortz et al., supra note 15; Michael J. Stortz et al., Plaintiffs Face Challenges in Cellular
Phone Application Privacy Litigation, 3 PRATT’S PRIVACY& CYBERSECURITY REPORT 159, 159–62,
(June 2017) (last visited Apr. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Stortz et. al, Plaintiffs, PRATT’S]
21 Stortz et al., supra note 15.
22 Id.
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2. Beacon technology litigation under the Wiretap Act
Alarmed by the extraordinary amount of personal data collected
by beacon technology smartphone apps, plaintiffs immediately turned
to the Wiretap Act as a tool of privacy protection.23
a. In re iPhone Application Litigation
One of the first cases to touch upon issues relating to the collec-
tion of mobile data through third party applications, In re iPhone Ap-
plication Litigation (“iPhone”)24 featured consumer Plaintiffs asserting
claims under the Stored Communications Act,25 the Wiretap Act,26 and
other federal and state laws.27 Specifically, Plaintiffs brought suit
against Apple, Inc., Admob, Inc., Flurry, Inc., AdMarval, Inc., Google,
Inc., and Medialets, Inc. (aside from Apple, referred to as “Mobile In-
dustry Defendants”), for allegedly violating federal and state privacy
laws, by providing a space for third-party application makers to gain
unauthorized access to users’ personal information over devices like
the iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch.28 Such information included Plain-
tiffs’ locations, the iPhones’ unique device identifiers (i.e. the device
serial code numbers), and users’ ages or genders.29 Additionally, Plain-
tiffs claimed that in violation of the Wiretap Act, Apple utilized the
GPS data cell phone towers and Wi-Fi networks to “develop an expan-
sive database of information about the geographic location of cellular
towers and wireless networks through the United States.”30
The District Court for the Northern District of California dis-
missed the claims arising under the Stored Communications Act, the
California Constitutional right to privacy, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, as well as the trespass, conversion and unjust enrichment
23 BROWNSTONE & NEWBY, supra note 3, § 9:154 (“mobile apps’ gathering of information on
device users—as well as other “tracking” methods—have come to the forefront in civil lawsuits
and government enforcement proceedings. . . . In a number of the civil enforcement actions, mul-
tiple theories are interposed as bases for claims for relief, including alleged violations of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, state wiretap acts, the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act and its state law counterparts, state unfair competition laws and common law claims for in-
vasion of privacy, conversion and trespass to chattels.”).
24 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
25 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
26 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).
27 iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1040; see also Shelton Abramson & Mali Friedman, Key Hold-
ings in the In re iPhone Application Dismissal Order, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP: INSIDE
PRIVACY (June 18, 2012), https://www.insideprivacy.com/advertising-marketing/district-court-
dismisses-stored-commuications-act-and-wiretap-act-claims-against-apple-for-iphone-da/ [https://
perma.cc/RY4P-T392].
28 iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1048–49.
29 Id. at 1050.
30 Id. at 1048.
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claims.31 In dismissing the class claims against the Wiretap Act, the
district court cited Ninth Circuit authority in contending that “‘con-
tent’ is limited to information the user intended to communicate, such
as the words spoken in a phone call.”32 Because the alleged “content”
that Apple collected was solely the mobile device users’ geolocation da-
ta, which was generated automatically, such did not constitute “con-
tent” susceptible to interception under the Wiretap Act.”33
Although the court’s ruling was promising to tech defendants in
Silicon Valley, plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act would take a
slightly more creative form four years later in Satchell v. Sonic Notify,
Inc.,34 and Rackemann v. LISNR, Inc.35
b. Satchell v. Sonic Notify, Inc.
Satchell, the first case to truly test the applicability of the Wire-
tap Act to smartphone apps with “tracking” features, resulted in a mo-
tion to dismiss in February 2017.36 Like the Plaintiffs in iPhone37 the
Satchell plaintiff, a Golden State Warriors fan, alleged that the team’s
mobile application—which utilized new technology to provide users
up-to-date scores, statistics, schedules, and news about the team—had
recorded her conversations without her knowledge or consent.38 The
corporations defended the use of the technology, arguing that it offers
a valuable service to consumers in the form of “targeted and specific
advertisements, promotions, [and] content,” as informed by the con-
sumer’s precise GPS location.39 However, Satchell offered a strong re-
buttal, stating that the mobile application, in violation of the Wiretap
Act, was programmed to “turn on a consumer’s Microphone,” which
would then allow the App to “listen[] [t]o and pick[] up any and all au-
dio within range. . . . until [the App] is closed—either when the con-
sumer’s smartphone is shut off or when the consumer ‘hard closes’ the
App.”40 Moreover, although the app did request Satchell’s permission
for certain features, the Defendants had failed to inform consumers
31 Id. at 1078.
32 Id. at 1061.
33 Id.
34 234 F. Supp. 3d 996 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
35 No. 17-CV-624, 2017 WL 4340349 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017).
36 234 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
37 844 F. Supp. at 1041.
38 234 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
39 Id.
40 Id.
246 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2018
that the “App uses audio beacon technology that surreptitiously turns
on consumers’ smartphone microphones and listens in.”41
While the court found that the violation of Satchell’s privacy
rights was sufficient to show injury-in-fact, the court ultimately held
that she had failed to allege facts demonstrating that the Warriors
had intercepted her oral communications within the meaning of the
Act.42 Furthermore, with regards to both defendants, the court ruled
that Satchell had failed to state a claim based on illegal “use” of her
information under the Wiretap Act. She did not allege sufficient facts
to demonstrate that the contents of her communication were utilized
to craft the targeted advertising sent to her via the application.43 No-
tably, however, the court found that Signal360, the technology provid-
er of the app, did “intentionally intercept” her communications, given
the deliberate design of the app’s technology that enabled the collect-
ing of such information.44
c. Rackemann v. LISNR, Inc.
Facing similar allegations as the Golden State Warriors in Satch-
ell, in Rackemann v. LISNR, Inc.,45 the Indianapolis Colts football
franchise, and its mobile application developers (LISNR, Inc. and
Adept Mobile, LLC) were sued for alleged violations of federal anti-
wiretapping laws in the operation of the Colts’ mobile application.46
Filing as a putative class action in the Northern District of Illinois, the
representative plaintiff, Alan Rackemann, alleged that Defendants
had violated the Wiretap Act by “hijacking” application users’
smartphones with the intent of transforming them into listening de-
vices that possessed the capability to surreptitiously record applica-
tion users’ personal communications.47 Specifically, under § 2511(1)(a)
of the Wiretap Act, Rackemann claimed that the applications were
programmed to intercept users’ “private conversations, including oral
communications,” despite the “exhibited expectations” of himself and
other class members that “such communication were to remain private
and would not otherwise be subject to interception under circumstanc-
es justifying such expectation.”48 Under § 2511(d) of the Wiretap Act,
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
43 Id. at 1008–09.
44 Id. at 1006–08. Note, however, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to allege suffi-
cient facts to show that any of the defendants intercepted her communications.
45 No. 17-CV-624, 2017 WL 4340349 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017).
46 Id. at *1.
47 Id. at *1–2.
48 Id. at *3.
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Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants subsequently used these inter-
cepted communications to their economic benefit in the form of direct
marketing.49
The court dismissed the unlawful “use” claim given Plaintiff failed
to demonstrate any plausible connection between the specific contents
of the allegedly intercepted communications, and the advertising sub-
sequently directed at him.50 However, the “interception” claims were
maintained.51 In making the decision, the court deferred to
Rackemann’s allegations that during the four years the app was in-
stalled on his smartphone, it was plausible that the listening function
had been activated during periods in which he engaged in private oral
communications.52 In reaching the decision, the court was sympathetic
to Rackemann’s inference of interception because the app was deliber-
ately designed to receive instructions developed by the Colts and
Adept Mobile, which designated a number of date and time intervals
during which the “listening” microphone was to be activated by the
Application.53 The court rejected Defendants’ contention that “inter-
ception” under the Wiretap Act means that a defendant must have
come “into possession of” the oral communications of the app users54
instead adopting the more plaintiff-friendly definition of “interception”
advanced by the Ninth Circuit, which requires simply that the “con-
tents of a . . . communication are captured or redirected in any way.” 55
The court agreed that the Plaintiff’s communications had been inter-
cepted because the app had built activity logs based on aggregated
beacon signals and recorded portions of audio collected from Plaintiff’s
cellphone activities (when the microphone was activated).56 Lastly,
although Defendants referred the court to a technical description on
the LISNR website, which explicitly states that the embedded micro-
phones only record beacon tones, and do not record any other audible
49 Id.
50 Id. at *8–9. Based on the court’s dicta and dismissal without prejudice, it would seem that
if Plaintiff could manage to trace the content of his advertising directly to the content of his con-
versations, he would have a better case. However, this seems to be an incredibly difficult hurdle
to overcome, as it would require Plaintiff to essentially eliminate any influence of the Beacon
symbols and his corresponding physical locations (that matched with the Beacon signals), on the
content of the advertisements.
51 Id. at *9.
52 Id. at *5–6. It is important to note that the court agreed with this premise even though
Rackemann could not provide any specific dates and times in which his private conversations
had been recorded.
53 Id. at *5.
54 Id. at *6.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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sounds or communications,57 the court was unwilling to entertain this
written explanation at the motion to dismiss stage, as defendants had
not incorporated such into their response.58
C. The Legal Framework of a Successful Intrusion upon Seclusion
Opinion for Electronic Privacy Litigants in California
1. Opperman v. Path, Inc.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s limited initial success in
Rackemann,59 beacon fact patterns of this nature seem relatively un-
likely to even survive summary judgment under § 2511(1)(a) of the
Wiretap Act, let alone result in a successful verdict for plaintiffs upon
the conclusion of trial. However, an alternative route via a common
law intrusion upon seclusion privacy claim seems viable, based on the
legal analysis offered in a successful ruling for litigants in Opperman
v. Path, Inc.,60 an electronic privacy case filed in 2014 within the Dis-
trict Court of the Northern District of California.61 Representing a
long-running set of consolidated cases against Apple and other social
and gaming mobile app developers, Opperman featured an attempted
class of consumer plaintiffs asserting a number of common law and
statutory claims against Defendants.62 Specifically, the class alleged
unlawful privacy intrusions into their personal contact information
based on the app developers’ intentional programming of the applica-
tions to access users’ iPhone address books without their consent.63 As
57 Id. at *7.
58 Id. Under the Wiretap Act, “contents” must include “any information concerning the sub-
stance, purport, or meaning of that [oral] communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012). Invoking
this definition, defendants attempted to undermine Plaintiff’s claim that the App had actually
acquired the “content” of his communications by explaining that the app’s technological functions
are limited to “temporarily record[ing]” portions of “audio” for limited periods of time. Id. at *6.
Moreover, according to Defendants, no audible communications are actually recorded; rather,
once all of the data from a user’s phone is aggregated, it is stripped down for the purpose of only
“analyz[ing] and monitor[ing]” the beacon tones. Id. at *7.
59 Following the district court’s partial granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss in
Rackemann, it does not appear that plaintiff pursued further action. No. 17-CV-624, 2017 WL
4340349 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017).
60 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1029. As additional evidence of the troubles plaintiffs have faced in utilizing state
and federal statutory privacy laws as a medium through which to advance beacon technology
claims, it is relevant to note Opperman v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CA-219, 2012 WL 4105189 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 23, 2012). In the earliest filing of this class action, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ origi-
nal and amended class action complaints alleging that apps from Path, Facebook, Twitter, Apple,
Beluga, Yelp, Burbn, Instagram, Foursquare Labs, Gowalla, Foodspoting, Hipster, LinkedIn,
Rovio Mobile, ZeptoLap, Chillingo, Electronic Arts and Kik Interactive secretly and unlawfully
copy, upload, and store users’ address book data without their knowledge or consent in violations
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the Tex-
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countered by Defendants, the purpose of this design feature was to as-
sist users in locating other users whom they already knew within the
app network.64 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs asserted a number of common
law claims for invasion of privacy, including intrusion upon seclusion,
conversion, negligence, and trespass to chattels.65 In addition, Plain-
tiffs asserted violations of state and federal wiretap laws.66
Like the court in iPhone, the Opperman court dismissed both the
federal and state wiretap claims, given that Plaintiffs alleged access to
stored data, as opposed to showing an interception of oral communica-
tion.67 The court also dismissed the majority of Apple’s defenses based
on Plaintiffs’ lack of Article III standing.68 Notably, however, the
Court did find for the common law intrusion upon seclusion claim.69
In fact, the court’s lengthy intrusion upon seclusion reasoning is
worth elaborating on, given such analysis sheds light upon the height-
ened protections California’s case law affords to the privacy of citizens.
This type of environment could prove particularly conducive for the
legal battles waged by future mobile phone users’ in their challenges
against the use of mobile tracking technology.
2. Intrusion upon seclusion analysis
California’s intrusion upon seclusion standard mirrors the Second
Restatement of Torts requirement. Under the California standard, a
plaintiff must show a defendant has “(1) intru[ded] into [plaintiff’s]
private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive
to a reasonable person”70 before an actionable claim can be made. In
the backdrop of this test, California courts emphasize the importance
of “personal isolation and personal control,” and the connection of such
concepts to “personal freedom and dignity.”71 However, courts will only
find an intrusion if the plaintiff demonstrates “an objectively reasona-
ble expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or
data source,” which is evaluated based on several factors, including: a
as Wiretap Act, among others.
64 Id. at 1029.
65 Id. at 1030.
66 Id. at 1029–30. In addition to violations of federal and state wiretap laws, Plaintiff assert-
ed violations of the following: California’s Unfair Competition Law, California’s False and Mis-
leading Advertising Law, the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act,
California and Texas Wiretap Acts, the federal Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, the federal Wire-
tap Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
67 Id. at 1063–64.
68 Id. at 1036–39.
69 Id. at 1058–61.
70 Id. at 1058.
71 Id.
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plaintiff’s advance notice of an impending action, industry customs,
industry practices, and any private physical settings, which could
“create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy.”72
Similarly, when evaluating the reasonableness of the privacy ex-
pectation, courts contend that “the presence or absence of opportuni-
ties to consent voluntarily to activities impacting privacy interests ob-
viously affects the expectations of the participant.”73 As per the
“offensiveness” prong, California courts require that the “interference
with the plaintiff’s seclusion” be a “substantial one, of a kind that
would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, as the re-
sult of conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object.”74
In analyzing the factual circumstances related to such, courts look to:
“the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances sur-
rounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objec-
tives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those
whose privacy is invaded.”75
Determining if a legally protected privacy interest is at stake is a
question of law, while plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy and
the offensiveness of defendant’s conduct as a serious invasion of priva-
cy are analyzed as mixed questions of law and fact.76 In making the
claim, plaintiffs need not allege any damages or economic injury from
the intrusion upon seclusion, as the “intrusion” itself represents the
injury.77 Thus, if a plaintiff prevails on the claim, he may recover
damages for “anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation, shame, depres-
sion, feelings of powerlessness, anguish, etc.”78
Conforming to the state standard, the Opperman Plaintiffs al-
leged in their complaint that “[b]y surreptitiously obtaining, improper-
ly gaining knowledge, reviewing and retaining Plaintiffs’ private mo-
bile address books (or substantial portions thereof), the App
Defendants intentionally intruded on and into each respective Plain-
tiff’s solitude, seclusion or private affairs.”79 Moreover, in asserting
that this type of intrusion should be viewed as “highly offensive to a
reasonable person,” Plaintiffs referenced the significant amount of
public and governmental criticism of this practice, which has been
captured in “myriad newspaper articles, blogs, op eds., and investiga-
72 Id. at 1059.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1060.
75 Id. (citing Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1483–84 (1986)).
76 Id. at 1059.
77 Id. at 1061.
78 Id. at 1061 (citing Operating Eng’rs Local 3 v. Johnson, 110 Cal. App. 4th 180, 187 (2003)
(quoting Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1485 (1986)).
79 Id. at 1058.
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tive exposes” written in objection to Defendant’s specific conduct and
beacon technology in general.80 As further proof of the outrageous na-
ture of Defendants’ practices, Plaintiffs highlighted the number of
Federal Trade Commission and Congressional inquiries and investiga-
tions that have been conducted on app developers’ technologies.81 Alt-
hough the App Defendants did not contest that Plaintiffs’ had a legally
protectable privacy interest in their mobile address books, and that
the applications intruded upon that interest by accessing the content
of such books, they argued that Plaintiffs did not have (1) a reasonable
expectation of privacy in such information, and (2) the intrusion was
“not sufficiently offensive to give rise to a claim for intrusion upon se-
clusion.”82
a. Reasonable expectation of privacy
Perhaps operating under the weight of the high protections the
state of California places on cell phone data, as well as the influential
dicta offered on this matter by the Supreme Court,83 the Opperman
court had little hesitation concluding that Plaintiffs’ expectation of
privacy in the content of their iDevice address books was reasonable
as a matter of law.84 The court also concluded that Plaintiffs main-
tained a reasonable expectation of privacy even after applications like
Gowalla and Instagram had explicitly asked for their consent to use of
the microphone upon application download, and even after the Apps
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1061.
82 Id. at 1059.
83 In refusing to extend the holdings of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) and United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (precedent allowing for broader officer exemptions to
search a suspect’s possessions without a judicial warrant) the Riley court found an important
distinction in the vast quantity of information that could be collected from the search of cell
phones:
[Robinson and Chimel] require us to decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine
applies to modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important
feature of human anatomy. A smart phone of the sort taken from Riley was unheard of
ten years ago; a significant majority of American adults now own such phones. See A.
Smith, Pew Research Center, Smartphone Ownership—2013 Update (June 5, 2013) . . .
There are no comparable risks when the search is of digital data. In addi-
tion, Robinson regarded any privacy interests retained by an individual after arrest as
significantly diminished by the fact of the arrest itself. Cell phones, however, place vast
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals. A search of the
information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search
considered in Robinson.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014).
84 Opperman, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1059.
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had provided further notification of the microphones’ activation.85 In
fact, the court declared the users’ submission of consent had been “in-
valid” because it was “obtained by fraud.”86 The court explained its
fraud determination was a function of Plaintiffs’ allegation that App
Defendants misrepresented their purpose when asking for consent:
specifically, App Defendants had advertised that the app would only
“‘scan’ Plaintiffs’ address books for purposes of the ‘find friends’ fea-
ture.”87 Problematically, the app failed to disclose that as it scanned
their address books, it would also be “transmit[ting] a copy of the ad-
dress book to Defendants for their own [future] use.”88 According to
Plaintiffs, if they had known of this future illicit purpose, they “would
not have consented.”89
b. Offensiveness
The most promising finding for future plaintiffs in beacon track-
ing suits seems to be the Opperman court’s decision that Defendants’
conduct was not “routine commercial behavior,” and therefore, could
be considered “highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man.”90 In
reaching this decision, the Opperman court first dismissed the prevail-
ing precedent of the iPhone court, which had determined that App De-
fendants’ “surreptitious tracking of personal data and geolocation in-
formation was not an ‘egregious breach of social norms’” as to
constitute “offensive [conduct] to the ordinary reasonable man.”91 In
coming to this finding, the iPhone court relied on the holding of a 2011
case, Folgelstrom v. Lamps Plus, Inc.,92 where Plaintiff advanced an
intrusion upon seclusion claim based on defendant retailers’ custom-
ary request for customers’ zip codes in order to match them to home
mailing addresses for future mail marketing.93 Ultimately, the Folgel-
85 Id. at 1060–61.
86 Id. at 1060 (“See Rest. (2d) of Torts § 892B (1979) (“If the person consenting to the conduct
of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion of
his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the
other or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unex-
pected invasion or harm.”); Sanchez–Scott v. Alza Pharm., 86 Cal. App. 4th 365, 377–78 (2001)
(sustaining intrusion upon seclusion claim where doctor obtained consent of patient to breast
examination in front of a drug salesperson without disclosing salesperson was not a medical pro-
fessional).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1060–61.
91 Id. at 1060 (citing In re iPhone Application Litigation, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (N.D.
Cal. 2012)).
92 195 Cal. App. 4th 986 (2011).
93 Opperman, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1060 (citing id. at 992).
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strom court dismissed the intrusion upon seclusion claim, concluding
Plaintiffs did not have a legally protected private interest in their
mailing addresses, and retailer’s conduct was not egregious, but mere-
ly represented “routine commercial behavior.”94
However, the Opperman court swiftly distinguished Folgelstrom
from the facts at hand, after determining that the instant situation
involved actual theft of the Plaintiffs’ personal contact lists, which
were deemed “more private than a person’s mailing address.”95 Fur-
thermore, although the court was cognizant of the argument that rea-
sonable expectations should be eroded in the modern age of a connect-
ed and somewhat free-flowing Internet, it refused to agree that a
“surreptitious theft of personal contact information” could be charac-
terized as “routine commercial behavior.”96 Plaintiffs’ evidence of wide
public and Congressional condemnation of beacon tracking data collec-
tion, which included documented investigations and public statements
made by consumer groups, the media, the Federal Trade Commission
and Congress, added legitimacy to the court’s affirmation of offensive-
ness.97
c. Damages
The court determined that Plaintiffs had successfully demon-
strated Article III standing because the “intrusion” itself, represents
an injury.98 Therefore, App Defendants’ defense that Plaintiffs had
failed to adequately allege economic injury was to no avail.99 Accord-
ing to the court, and in keeping pace with historic common law privacy
actions, if Plaintiffs were to succeed on this claim, they could recover
damages correlating to their “anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation,
shame, depression, feelings of powerlessness, anguish, etc.”100
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1061.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1061.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing Operating Eng’rs Local 3 v. Johnson, 110 Cal. App. 4th 180, 187 (2003) (quoting
Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1485 (1986))).
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III. NUANCED CONSIDERATIONS AND ARGUMENTS WITHIN THE
SPECIALIZED SPHERE OF ELECTRONIC PRIVACY LAW
A. The Wiretap Act & Other Federal Privacy Statutes Offer Plain-
tiffs Unpredictable Privacy Protections
A difficult problem posed to future plaintiffs affected by beacon
technology is that any privacy intrusions wrought by the technology
fail to neatly trigger a violation under one of the main existing federal
privacy statutes, including: the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,101 the
Stored Communications Act (Title II of the ECPA),102 the Federal
Wiretap Act (Title I of the ECPA),103 the CAN-SPAM Act,104 the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),105 the Children’s Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act,106 and the Video Privacy Protection Act.107 While
plaintiffs’ challenges in this domain make sense theoretically—as bea-
con technology is arguably “acquiring” information about the user for
a targeted marketing purpose—plaintiffs will likely continue to lose at
the motion to dismiss stage. As evident in the Satchell court’s analy-
sis, despite Plaintiff showing the app had intentionally “intercepted”
her oral communications based on its deliberate design features, the
Court concluded she had not plausibly demonstrated that the apps
had “captured” the content of her conversations by actually exercising
possession or control over them.108
Relatedly, Plaintiff could not allege facts showing the app was
even “activated” at the exact moment she had been engaged in the al-
legedly “captured” private conversations, thus leading to speculation
as to whether contents of the conversation were actually acquired (as
opposed to the Defendants merely collecting the beacon signals).109
Satchell and Rackemann further demonstrate another perilous obsta-
cle for future plaintiffs as presented by the “unlawful use” claim,
wherein Plaintiffs must advance sufficient facts to demonstrate that
the specific content of the alleged “intercepted” conversations correlat-
ed positively with the content of the subsequently targeted ads sent by
the application.110 This is an especially difficult task, as it will require
101 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
102 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
103 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012).
104 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2012).
105 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
106 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012).
107 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
108 Satchell v. Sonic Notify, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1005–08 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
109 Id. at 1006–07.
110 Id. at 1008–09; Rackemann v. LISNR, Inc., No. 17-CV-624, 2017 WL 4340349, at *8–9
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plaintiffs to eliminate all potentially contributing variables, namely
the beacon signals, as being responsible for the content of the ads.
While the Plaintiff’s claim in Rackemann survived the motion to
dismiss stage an analysis suggests this was based on the Defendants’
failure to include critical facts in its response about the limits of the
beacon technology in its app. Namely, Defendants’ failed to respond
with documentation .hat the app merely captured inaudible beacon
signals, as opposed to intercepting audible sounds or communications.
Moreover, the Defendants failed to provide important documented ex-
planations related to the limited activation periods in which the mi-
crophone is turned on (a function that is controlled by the App Devel-
opers and the Colts).111 If the Defendants were able to show specific
times and limits to the microphone’s use in an amended response, it
would be unlikely that a plaintiff could fully document that her con-
versations took place at the exact moments the microphone was acti-
vated.
B. The Threat of Common Law Privacy Claims Against Defendants
Offers More Consistent Protection for Plaintiffs, Particularly in
California
However, based on the Opperman court’s promising analysis of
Plaintiffs’ intrusion upon seclusion claim, not all hope is lost for future
beacon technology litigants. In fact, throughout history, common law
privacy claims have been seen as particularly useful when a particular
privacy issue fails to fall neatly within the scope of statutory relief of-
fered by current privacy statutes.112 The limits of these statutes, as ev-
ident by the unsuccessful electronic privacy suits in Northern Califor-
nia, are likely a function of the rapid pace in which technology shifts,
leaving the legislature in the dust when it comes to the creation of en-
compassing laws.
1. Main differences between federal privacy laws and the com-
mon law avenue
Unlike federal and state privacy statutes, common law privacy
theories require that plaintiffs mount an additional hurdle of having
to show that the information invaded is sufficiently “private.”113 More-
over, unlike California courts, a number of other state courts will re-
quire plaintiffs to prove injury beyond the mere invasion, which can
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017).
111 Rackemann, 2017 WL 4340349, at *6–7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017).
112 BROWNSTONE&NEWBY, supra note 3 § 9:120.
113 Id.
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prove a difficult burden when dealing with speculative invasions of
privacy. However, generally, the heart of a court’s analysis for this
theory will still center upon the issues of (1) whether plaintiffs had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information, and (2) whether
the conduct of the defendant was “sufficiently egregious or offensive to
justify relief.”114
2. The general common law invasion of privacy umbrella
States vary in the degree to which they recognize the four com-
mon law privacy causes of action, which include: (a) intrusion upon
the seclusion of another; (b) appropriation of another’s name or like-
ness; (c) public disclosure of private facts; and, (d) publicity that places
the other in a false light before the public.115 For example, some states
like North Dakota and Wyoming refuse to recognize any of the theo-
ries in common law or statutory form.116 On the other hand, Califor-
nia, a state where a vast quantity of technology litigation occurs be-
cause of the presence of technology companies, recognizes all four
common law privacy theories.117 Nonetheless, plaintiffs engaging in
most types of electronic privacy litigation, including plaintiffs in Op-
perman, most commonly invoke: (1) intrusion upon the seclusion or
solitude of another; and (2) public disclosure of private facts.118
3. Intrusion upon seclusion in California
Guided by the Second Restatement of Torts, California’s “intru-
sion upon seclusion” framework requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a
defendant’s: (1) intentional intrusion into a private place, conversa-
tion, or matter, (2) in a manner “highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son.”119 To satisfy the first element, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
“the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy
surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data . . . [and] the plain-
tiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude
in the place, conversation or data source.”120 A plaintiff’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information disclosed is a question of fact
analyzed based on contextual circumstances.121
114 Id.
115 Id. § 9:123.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. § 9:124 (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 652B (1977 & Supp. Oct. 2014)).
120 Id. (citing Shulman v. Grp. W. Prods., Inc. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)).
121 Id. (citing Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos. 978 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal. 1999)).
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California’s guaranteed constitutional protections of privacy, cou-
pled with the state’s strong historic precedent supporting common law
privacy actions, foster a powerful environment for future plaintiffs lit-
igating electronic privacy claims. For example, the California Supreme
Court has made clear through a number of rulings that “targeted vid-
eo surveillance” by private and public employers can represent an in-
trusion into employees’ reasonable expectation of privacy, even if the
private sector employer “did not expect or intend to catch plaintiffs on
tape.”122 Moreover, echoing the state’s long line of judicial decisions on
the matter, California statutes strictly prohibit all forms of video sur-
veillance in a number of listed locations, as well as “any other area in
which the occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy,” the latter
of which based on circumstances and context.123 In the backdrop of
these rulings and statutory provisions, it would seem beacon litigants
could make a strong case that courts should view prohibited video
surveillance in the same light as pervasive beacon audio and physical
tracking surveillance. Both forms of surveillance provide a compre-
hensive biographical picture of plaintiff’s whereabouts, habits, and ac-
tivities. Moreover, in anticipation of defendant application developers’
argument that a beacon powered app is not designed intentionally to
track the oral communications of plaintiffs, plaintiffs can counter with
the argument that users’ microphones turn on and off (based on users’
physical location), without explicitly notifying the users of every acti-
vation or requiring consent at the given moment the technology begins
collecting data.124
Although California’s intrusion upon seclusion precedent has not
been tested fully in the electronic privacy sphere, the notably progres-
sive tendency of California’s federal and state courts’ decision-making
on electronic privacy issues suggests that judges will likely be willing
to accept litigants’ arguments regarding the “offensive” and “unrea-
sonable” nature of beacon technology intrusions into individuals’
“physical” and “sensory” zones of privacy.125 In fact, as outlined above,
122 Id. (citing Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1066 (Cal. 2009)).
123 Id. at n.14.
124 A court could in fact, conclude this is an “egregious” or “offensive” lack of consent, even
after users’ offered general consent to the microphone’s use upon download.
125 Opperman, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“See, e.g., United States v. Zavala,
541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) (‘[C]ell phones contain a wealth of private information, includ-
ing emails, text messages, call histories, address books, and subscriber numbers. Zavala had a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding this information.’); United States v. Cerna, No. 08-
CV-730, 2010 WL 5387694 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) (citing Zavala) (‘Luis Herrera had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the contents of the seized phones as his physical possession of the
cell phones created a reasonable expectation of privacy in their contents.’); United States v.
Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (criminal defendant had expectation of privacy in
contents of pager because ‘[t]he expectation of privacy in an electronic repository for personal
data is therefore analogous to that in a personal address book or other repository for such infor-
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California courts have already gotten a sense of this type of litigation
in Opperman.126 Furthermore, although the factual scenarios present-
ed by Satchell and Opperman were not analogous, it is not a stretch to
pinpoint relevant parallels between both complaints as to warrant an
extension of the Opperman analysis to future beacon litigation.
Particularly, while Satchell can be viewed as a case centered upon
defendant app developers’ surreptitious collection of identifying infor-
mation about phone users’ via users’ address books, Opperman can be
viewed similarly as defendant app developers undertaking a surrepti-
tious collection of identifying information about phone users’ via their
locations and audible noises. In both cases, it is clear that the defend-
ants’ intentional actions contributed to the building of a comprehen-
sive biographical profile of application users without their explicit
consent.127 Because plaintiffs were bringing the action under common
law intrusion upon seclusion (as opposed to the Wiretap Act), the
courts were able to decisively make a ruling that the “surreptitious
theft of personal contact information,” was sufficiently offensive, and
did not qualify as “routine commercial behavior.”128
Future litigants can also take solace in the Opperman court’s de-
cision to dismiss Defendants’ undisputed assertion that Plaintiffs had
voluntarily installed the applications on their phones and had volun-
tarily consented to turning on the app’s scanning feature during the
application download process.129 In so doing, the court dismissed De-
fendant’s central claims that Plaintiffs’ voluntary consent should bar
them from alleging Defendants’ conduct was highly offensive.130 Criti-
cally, the court accepted Plaintiffs’ standing based on the simple exist-
ence of an alleged “intrusion,” which qualified as the “injury.”131 Ac-
cordingly, Defendants’ contestation that Plaintiffs lacked standing
because of failure to allege any harm or calculate damages was ig-
nored.132
Also relevant for future litigants is the California courts’ general
willingness to accept that citizens have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contact information stored in their phones, as held by
mation’)”).
126 Id. at 1018.
127 See id. at 1033; see also Satchell v. Sonic Notify, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 3d 996, 999–1000 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
128 See 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1061.
129 Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (stating that if acti-
vated by consent, the app’s scanning feature would scan users’ address books to connect such us-
er to other “friends” in the app’s network).
130 Id. at 1060.
131 Id. at 1061.
132 Id.
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the Opperman court.133 That ruling notably breaks pace with other
federal courts, who have suggested that in the modern age of technol-
ogy, phenomena like data-sharing, Cloud enabled devices, and an in-
creasingly connected, public internet atmosphere, can erode such ex-
pectations.134
Clearly then, when drafting their intrusion upon seclusion com-
mon law claims for California courts, beacon litigants should empha-
size the following in their complaints:
1) Assert their Article III standing by demonstrating the sim-
ple existence of an unlawful “intrusion,” as defined by beacon-
detecting microphones operating at unknown intervals at un-
known times when the phone was turned on;
2) Argue that despite their voluntary consent to the activation
of microphones upon app download, they “would not have con-
sented” had they known all of the specific times in which the
microphone would be on, as well as the specific unlawful pur-
poses for which the microphone would be used by app develop-
ers and third-parties: namely, that the content would be used
for the collection of data about the user’s identity and activities
to be utilized for future marketing purposes;
3) Argue that they were not offered an opportunity to explicit-
ly consent to each instance in which the microphone was
turned on, which included potential periods where the micro-
phone was activated during their private conversations;
4) Argue that the Opperman ruling related to Plaintiffs’ rea-
sonable expectation of privacy to contact information in their
phone (the data in their mobile address book) can be easily ex-
tended to include phone users’ reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in the content, sounds and locations of their bodies while
carrying their phones; and,
5) Reference Congressional hearing and investigations to sup-
port the claim that unexpected beacon tracking is “highly of-
fensive,” which in no way should qualify as “routine commer-
cial behavior,” based on industry standards.
Although the aforementioned intrusion upon seclusion factors
could compel a number of California judges, they would likely not car-
133 See id. at 1059; see also BROWNSTONE & NEWBY, supra note 3, § 9:124 at n.29 (citing
Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534–35 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
134 See BROWNSTONE&NEWBY, supra note 3, § 9:124 at n.30.
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ry the same force under a state or federal Wiretap Act theory given
the legal limits of the latter.
C. Constitutional Backdrop Will Favorably Influence the Way Judg-
es Evaluate State Common Law Privacy Claims
The most important justification for plaintiffs to take advantage
of common law intrusion upon seclusion theories relates to the Su-
preme Court’s significant holding in Riley v. California,135 where the
Justices held that a law enforcement officer’s warrantless search of
the contents of a defendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest violated
the Fourth Amendment.136 When reaching the decision in Riley, the
high court made clear that individuals have reasonable and strong ex-
pectations of privacy in the data stored on their mobile phones, which
may even exceed the privacy interests they have in physical objects
and documents located in their homes.137 Although the case related to
Fourth Amendment searches of an alleged subject’s cell phone, in dic-
ta, the majority speculated about privacy concerns in other areas, par-
ticularly in connection to mobile phone applications and embedded
tracking technology. Of special note, the Court elaborated about the
dangers posed by the expansive capabilities of GPS monitoring devic-
es:
Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been.
Historic location information is a standard feature on many
smart phones and can reconstruct someone’s specific move-
ments down to the minute, not only around town but also with-
in a particular building. Mobile application software on a cell
phone, or “apps,” offer a range of tools for managing detailed
information about all aspects of a person’s life.138
Both of these significant premises have, and will continue, to impact
the factors evaluated by California courts in an electronic privacy in-
trusion upon seclusion common law claim and relate critically to fact
patterns involving beacon technology. In taking advantage of this
holding in the future, beacon litigants should be prepared to argue:
1) They have reasonable and strong expectations of privacy
regarding the data stored on their mobile phones, which in-
135 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
136 BROWNSTONE&NEWBY, supra note 3, § 9:124 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473).
137 Id. (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490).
138 Id.
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cludes any audible noises, or movements, captured by their
phones through their basic use;
2) As similar to GPS monitoring devices, which the Supreme
Court now expresses concerns about, beacon technology allows
for the generation of a “precise, comprehensive record of a per-
son’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associ-
ations.”139 However, technology experts contend that beacon
technology is even more invasive than GPS tracking technolo-
gy, in that it: (1) can be activated even when the phone is not
connected to the internet; and (2) has the power to track physi-
cal and audio data.140
Another influential finding by the Supreme Court, which could
serve as helpful backdrop for future beacon litigation, is derived from
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence (signed onto by five Justices) in
United States v. Jones, where she suggested the necessity of maintain-
ing high protections for person’s privacy interests during the routine
and voluntary disclosure of electronic data to third party service pro-
viders:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an indi-
vidual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. . . . This approach is ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone num-
bers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs
that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they corre-
spond to their Internet service providers; and the books, grocer-
ies, and medications they purchase to online retailers.141
With the Opperman court’s example, courts will likely find the weight
of this statement to be particularly influential when evaluating com-
panies’ defenses that their behavior was not “offensive” under the in-
139 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
140 Newman, supra note 16.
141 BROWNSTONE & NEWBY, supra note 3, 9:124 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 417); See also
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014) (holding that Defendant had reasonable
expectation of privacy under Massachusetts Constitution in cell site location information main-
tained by Defendant’s mobile phone provider)); but see United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421
(4th Cir. 2016) (holding that third-party doctrine applies to cell site location information); see al-
so United States v. Post, 997 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (holding that Defendant had no
privacy interest in metadata of photos posted online).
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trusion upon seclusion standard because plaintiffs had voluntarily
provided consent to the use of the microphone. In fact, it would seem
that all future “voluntary consent” defenses, particularly when used
by application developers who incorporate beacon technology into their
products, will be moot. Instead, judges will likely sympathize with us-
ers’ lack of awareness that they were consenting to such an extraordi-
nary disclosure of identifying information in the course of performing
a mundane task like downloading a mobile phone application.
D. Why Common Law Theories Are Superior to a Legislative Re-
sponse within the Electronic Privacy Sphere
Given the increasing ubiquity of beacon-like technology within
mobile phone applications, observers of this legal quandary likely be-
lieve Congress or state legislatures will have sufficient incentive to
propose another electronic privacy law tailored to the specific nuances
of audio-GPS tracking technology. But while a statute to fill this legal
hole would prove helpful, its effectiveness would be severely limited.
This is because the rate of change within various technology sub-
sectors may present complex issues defying simple statutory solutions.
The burgeoning beacon audio-tracking technology industry is of no ex-
ception, as the profits of commercial advertising are tied to beacon de-
velopers’ abilities to continually enhance the capturing capabilities of
their technology in order to present their clients with the greatest in-
formation related to consumers’ preferences.
Validating this conclusion with empirical evidence, law and eco-
nomics scholars Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, and Alessandro Ri-
boni suggest that common law theories of relief provide far greater
flexibility and efficiency than statutes if the legal environment is “suf-
ficiently heterogeneous and/or changes sufficiently often.”142 Alterna-
tively, the three assert, if the legal environment is “sufficiently ho-
mogenous and/or does not change very often, the Statute Law regime
dominates,” and benefits society by restraining courts from “be-
hav[ing] myopically and neglect[ing] ex-ante” welfare and policy con-
siderations in their statutory interpretation.143 This thesis is well-
applied within the context of beacon audio-tracking technology, where
the flexibility and factually sensitive nature of the “reasonable expec-
tations of privacy” and “offensiveness” prongs of an intrusion upon se-
clusion claim can be adapted progressively to the nuanced circum-
stances presented by novel beacon fact patterns. As a result, plaintiffs
142 Luca Anderlinie et al., Statute Law or Case Law?, (July 2008) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/26403/1/577103636.PDF [https://
perma.cc/WDZ9-KLRW].
143 Id. (emphasis added).
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will be offered far greater leeway in advancing compelling arguments
within their complaints and at summary judgment that underscore
the seriousness and unexpected nature of the privacy violation.
Unique arguments of this nature rarely fit within the rigid statutory
framework of provisions like § 2511(1)(a) and § 2511(1)(d) of the Wire-
tap Act.
In addition, the political realities of the legislative process suggest
that common law theories would offer a more reliable mechanism in
which to protect plaintiffs’ privacy rights. Unlike Congress or state
legislatures, state and federal judges are isolated from the overwhelm-
ing influence levied by interest groups in the crafting and interpreta-
tion of law.144 America’s technology sector in particular, which in-
cludes the “repeat” offenders in beacon litigation, is represented by
prominent and well-funded lobbyists in Washington, D.C., who exert
enormous pressure in ensuring sector-specific laws do not hamstring
the use and profitability of their clients’ main products.145 Such influ-
ence suggests that any state or federal legislative response could be
watered down significantly at the peril of consumers’ rights.
In comparison to distant state legislatures and Congress, district
judges within certain regions of the country are beginning to see more
derivations of general electronic privacy issues and specific beacon
claims. Repeated exposure to similar facts, evidence, and expert wit-
nesses lends itself to judges’ greater familiarity with the problems
posed by these new technologies. Ultimately, judges’ increased
knowledge and specialized understanding of this area of law could be
used most effectively in their informed weighing of the equities and
merits of the common law privacy standards through which plaintiffs
assert their grievances.
IV. CONCLUSION
At present, America is confronting an uneasy tug-of-war between
the benefits bestowed by technology designed to provide users “the
best experience possible” and consumers’ long-cherished expectations
that their actions relating to their cell phone usage will remain pri-
vate. Unfortunately, beacon technology, with its hybrid GPS location
tracking features and auditory capturing mechanisms, penetrates into
144 Roger Hayes, Living by the Rule of Law, IANPJ ON POLITICS (last visited Feb. 23, 2018),
https://pjcjournal.wordpress.com/common-law-vs-statutes/ [https://perma.cc/3PWA-CXFB].
145 See, e.g., Information Technology Industry Council, https://www.itic.org/ [https://perma
.cc/2QJT-6QKW]; see also Kieran McCarthy, Biggest Washington DC Lobbyist Is Now a Tech Gi-
ant (Yes, It’s Google), THE REGISTER (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/24
/google_washington_lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/LFC7-EZJD].
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two sacred spheres of citizens’ space, and does so without any explicit
consent by users.
Fortunately citizens can “pushback” against unwanted intrusions
within the court system, with the very act of filing cases sending a
powerful message to application developers and their clients that bea-
con technology must be limited. As this Comment has discussed, given
the slowness in which privacy laws are amended and the very seg-
mented nature of this set of laws in the first place, the beacon fact pat-
tern fails to fall neatly into any present legal framework. Even the
Wiretap Act, which initially appeared to offer the most promising ve-
hicle for beacon technology intrusions, has produced unpredictable re-
sults for plaintiffs. As a result, the privacy rights of unwitting beacon
technology users have remained vulnerable and inconsistently pro-
tected.
Accordingly, the uncomfortable lapse in the law should encourage
plaintiffs to reconsider trying their beacon claims under the old but
continuously flexible state common law privacy theories, particularly
the intrusion upon seclusion theory. Although not originally intended
for such novel privacy scenarios, the intrusion upon seclusion theory
has proven powerful in providing plaintiffs an adaptable and favorable
framework through which to establish defendant’s “intentional” intru-
sion into any private place, conversation, matter, or data source. The
positive direction of recent Supreme Court decisions, such as Riley v.
California146 and United States v. Jones,147 where the Justices have
expressed concerns about the “highly offensive” nature of certain con-
duct and the “reasonableness” of technology users’ expectations, pro-
vides future plaintiffs an opportunity to draft their complaints in a
compelling manner that will satisfy both prongs of the intrusion upon
seclusion test, while avoiding having to overcome the “interception”
hurdle of the Wiretap Act.
146 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
147 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
